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Introduction
A common assumption among policy-makers and pundits is that 
stabilisation and reconstruction will come  a er con icts in the 
Middle East and North Africa region have been settled. Indeed, 
in most previous cases, con ict settlements – brought  about by 
the decisive victory of one party or by the successful conclusion of 
a peace agreement – had always preceded post-war stabilisation. 
Internationally-assisted reconstruction, intended as both the physical 
rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure and the rehabilitation of the 
economy and governance institutions, were considered part and 
parcel of stabilisation e orts2.
 e MENA region’s wars do not seem to  t this model. Although 
violence has begun to diminish, the con icts are not over. No 
comprehensive settlement has been achieved to date, and the drivers 
and root causes of con icts are not being addressed. 
Stabilising the MENA region remains a top priority on the international 
agenda. However, the new concept of stabilisation is elusive and ill-
1.  is policy brief draws on the very rich discussion at the  nal roundtable of the 
MEDirections’ Annual Conference ‘Exiting War Economy Dynamics: What Future 
for Stabilisation and Reconstruction in MENA’, Florence, 19-20 November 2018.  e 
author is grateful to the conference participants for their insightful contributions. 
 e opinions expressed in this policy brief are solely those of the author.  
2. Graciana del Castillo (2008), Rebuilding War-Torn States.  e Challenges of Post 
Con ict Economic Reconstruction, Oxford University Press, p. 9-26. 
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de ned3, o en hiding the diverging political objectives 
of the international, regional and local players involved. 
 ere is no agreement on what the  nal outcome of 
stabilisation should be, nor on the appropriate tools to 
achieve it. 
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground is moving towards 
a reconstitution of political and economic systems with 
strong similarities to the pre-2011 situation.  Old political 
and economic elites are returning and reconstruction has 
already begun in Syria and Iraq. Because of the political 
economy dynamics at play, reconstruction will likely be 
used to re-establish patronage-clientelist mechanisms 
and to pay back friends and allies.  e result might well 
be increasing corruption, ine  ciency, exclusion and ine-
quality, and new con icts in the medium-to-long term 
cannot be excluded. To avoid major unintended conse-
quences, international actors will need to consider local 
and regional political economy actors and dynamics 
when thinking about the future of con icts, as well as 
when planning reconstruction policies and actions in the 
MENA region.
 e Quest for Stability
 e protracted wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, as 
well as the succession of crises in Iraq since 2003, are 
complex and multidimensional. While the situation 
in each country is unique, the con icts that started 
in 2011 (or a er the 2003 US invasion in the case of 
Iraq) have several features in common.  ey have 
deepened social and political fragmentation along 
ethnic, sectarian or tribal lines, as well as resulted in 
economic collapse and severe humanitarian crises. 
 e negative e ects of these con icts have spilled 
over into neighbouring countries through refugee 
 ows, the criminalisation of trans-border trade, 
increased tra  cking and people smuggling, as well 
as the movement of armed groups across state bor-
ders. Direct and indirect interventions by state, non-
state and transnational actors have made the resolu-
tion of these con icts particularly di  cult4.
3. For an analysis of the stabilisation process in post-Cold War con-
 icts see Paul K.Davis ed. (2011) ‘Dilemmas of Intervention. Social 
Science for Stabilisation and Reconstruction’, Rand, National Defense 
Research Institute
4. For an analysis of MENA con icts and their interrelation see Joost 
Hilterman, Tackling the MENA Region’s Intersecting Con icts, Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 22 December 2017 
A er years of bloody con ict, violence seems to be  nally 
diminishing. However, despite continuing international 
mediation e orts in Syria, Yemen and Libya, no inclu-
sive, lasting political settlements addressing the root 
causes of the uprisings seem likely to be reached in the 
short term5. In Syria, on the contrary, the regime’s com-
plete military victory over its opponents is considered to 
be increasingly probable. In Iraq, the post-2003 power-
sharing system led to institutionalisation of sectarianism 
and collusion between the political elite, armed groups 
and business actors.  e negative consequences of this 
political system played an important role in the rise of 
the Islamic State (IS), and are still present in post-IS Iraq6. 
Tough questions, like those concerning the choice of 
political governance model, decentralisation or feder-
alism, or more diversi ed and equitable economic sys-
tems – which for some time have been put forward as 
possible solutions to authoritarianism and instability 
– seem to have been put on hold.  e West-promoted 
search for a new, regional order in the MENA has also 
stalled, leaving space for continuing geopolitical con-
frontations and rivalry between regional powers.  
In view of the immense human su ering and economic 
destruction caused by wars, as well as of their continuing 
impact on the region and beyond, international, regional 
and local actors are searching for means to achieve sta-
bility. “Stabilisation” is now the guiding principle for inter-
national actors’ policies.  e problem, however, is that it is 
not clear what stabilisation entails. Beyond consensus on 
the need to move towards a durable end to the violence, 
international and regional players disagree explicitly or 
implicitly on what the  nal outcomes, objectives and 
instruments of stabilisation should be.7  e post-Cold 
War tenets of liberal democratic peace-building included 
the promotion of democracy, good governance, rule of 
law and the strengthening of well-functioning market 
economies.  But this model, with its unresolved questions 
5. Muriel Asseburg, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike Transfeld, Mission 
Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen SWP Research 
Paper, 8 October 2018
6. Sarwar Abdullah, ‘A er IS, Iraq’s Major Challenge is Corruption’, 
Fikra Forum, 2 August 2018 
7. Saskia Van Genugten, Drawing Lessons from Stabilisation Opera-
tions in the MENA Region, BLOG,  28 November 2017 
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on the role of external and local players and insu  cient 
levels of international engagement and long-term invest-
ment, has shown its limitations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
It is today openly contested by many non-Western actors 
involved in the MENA crises who consider the peace-
building model as a tool to expand western in uence in 
the region. 
One thing is clear. For many international players, 
including those in the West, the number one priority for 
stabilisation is addressing the situation of state failure 
and power vacuums, which have marked the regional 
context over the past eight years.   is situation has had 
many repercussions in terms of out ows of jihadists and 
refugees, disruptions in oil production, and regional dis-
order.  It is also perceived as the main source of insta-
bility and threat in the region and beyond.  e restora-
tion of authority and national sovereignties is thus seen 
as the solution to the problem, even if it entails a risk of 
allowing the return of authoritarian regimes based on 
exclusionary rule. 
Meanwhile, in Syria, as in Iraq and to a lesser extent in 
Libya, the focus among international actors has already 
shi ed to reconstruction. Reconstruction is not just the 
urgent physical rebuilding of destroyed houses and infra-
structure, or the rehabilitation of an economy or institu-
tions. It also has re-distributional economic and political 
e ects, creating winners and losers. Because of the reality 
on the ground, short-term political considerations are 
likely to dominate the scene. What will this mean for the 
reconstruction of war-torn MENA countries or their col-
lapsed economies and state institutions? How is recon-
struction likely to impact the broader region? 
Losers and Winners:  e Political 
Economy of Reconstruction
Socio-economic issues have played a critical role as 
con ict drivers: neglect and marginalization of less 
productive, peripheral regions; signi cant shortcom-
ings in social and local development; and unequal rent 
distribution from natural resources.  ese have created 
deep political and socio-economic divides in the MENA 
region. Neoliberal reforms and GDP growth in the 2000s, 
while increasing people’s expectations, have deepened 
long-standing structural problems. Indeed, the 2011 
uprisings were triggered by a widespread feeling of injus-
tice among large parts of the population in the face of 
rising inequality, exclusion from economic bene ts, lack 
of opportunities for young people and rampant unem-
ployment.8
 e struggle for the control of resources – including state 
institutions, natural resources, trading routes, strategic 
infrastructure and foreign support – has been a crucial 
component of the military con icts that have spread over 
the region since 2011.  e fortunes of rival political fac-
tions and armed groups have, to a large extent, depended 
on their ability to gain and maintain such assets. Highly 
lucrative pro teering and rent-seeking activities provided 
by the con icts have allowed many groups and networks 
to grow and thrive.  ese activities, though not neces-
sarily illegal, have exploited the advantages provided by 
power and military force, and have o en gone hand in 
hand with underground and illicit economies – including 
smuggling, tra  cking and kidnap-for-ransom – in a 
complex system of economic relations linking actors and 
markets, locally, nationally and regionally. 
High pro ts made through these activities are at the core 
of regional war economies. Over time, they have created 
a vast system of old and new vested interests and collu-
sion.  As such, the economies created by war are di  cult 
to disrupt and they represent an important factor in the 
prolongation of the con icts in Syria, Libya and Yemen. 
At the same time war economies are producing new 
business elites, a composite combination of old regime 
crony-capitalists and newcomers looking for opportuni-
ties to invest or launder capital in highly pro table enter-
prises. Against this backdrop, if priority is given to sta-
bilisation without the pre-existing political orders being 
fundamentally changed, the reconstitution of authority is 
very likely to also essentially reproduce the old patronage 
mechanisms of the pre-2011 regimes9. 
In Syria, for instance, it is probable that the interests of 
the Assad regime and its military allies will shape future 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Estimated in 2018 as 
costing $350-400 billion, reconstruction has already whet 
the appetite of local and international actors close to the 
8. See World Bank, Middle East and North Africa region,(2015) ‘Ine-
quality, Uprisings, and Con ict in the Arab World’, MENA Economic 
Monitor; and  Richard Javad Heydarian, ‘ e Economics of the Arab 
Spring’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 21 April 2011
9. Steven Heydemann,‘Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of 
Reconstruction in Fierce States’, Brookings, June 2018
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regime.  e regime will likely use it to distribute favours 
to clients and allies, thus consolidating its economic and 
political power.   e perpetuation and deepening of pre-
war political and economic dynamics will result in more 
corruption, waste, exclusion and inequality, while repro-
ducing the same exclusionary and authoritarian traits 
which led to the uprising and war.10
In Libya, war economy dynamics have allowed the for-
mation of networks comprising armed groups, criminals, 
corrupt businessmen and politicians. While enriching 
themselves, these networks e ectively use predatory 
practices and illicit businesses to fund the continuation of 
their role in violence and in the perpetuation of the con-
 ict.  eir presence represents a major hindrance for the 
rehabilitation of the formal economy and Libyan institu-
tions, o en acting as spoilers of political and economic 
reforms.  An e ective reconstitution of political authority 
is therefore needed to put an end to predation by many 
groups and to control both licit and illicit networks.11
 is, in turn, may well require  nding the appropriate 
incentives to permit the reconversion of some of these 
actors into legitimate political and economic players. 
 e People Factor: Return and 
Reconstruction
MENA civil wars have resulted in a huge number of inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. How return 
and reintegration are handled will be a key determinant 
of the direction that the stabilisation and reconstruction 
policies might take.
Social inclusion and a fair distribution of peace dividends 
to include IDPs and refugees would be key to rebuilding 
the social fabric of war-torn areas a er many years of 
divisive con ict have accentuated ethnic, tribal, sectarian 
or social cleavages in those societies.   e lack of fair and 
e ective reintegration policies will have long-term social 
and political repercussions for post-con ict countries. 
10. Joseph Daher,  e Political Economic context of Syria’s Reconstruc-
tion: A prospective in light of a legacy of unequal development. Research 
Project Report 2018/05, RSCAS/Middle East Directions December 
2018  
11. Tim Eaton, ‘Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Pro teering and 
State Weakness’, Chatham House, 12 April 2018
But displacement also has a high socio-economic cost 
and an opportunity cost in the reconstruction phase. In 
addition to safety and security, which are the pre-condi-
tion for return, returnees also need infrastructure and 
basic services, the provision of which could kick start 
economic growth. In turn, they could provide the bulk of 
entrepreneurs, workforce and consumers that are needed 
for reconstruction, for sustainable job creation, which 
reintegrates them e ectively in the economy and creates 
the jobs needed to demobilise  ghters.  e rapid restora-
tion and qualitative improvement of the education sector, 
heavily damaged by war, would be necessary to recu-
perate the lost school years for the younger generations, 
to upgrade the human capital and make it functional 
for reconstruction, recovery and future development.12
A slow and di  cult pace of return will have a negative 
impact on reconstruction as a result of lost opportunities 
and additional long-term costs. 
Finally, the modalities and timing of their return could 
also have regional rami cations, for example Syrian ref-
ugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan. Reducing the socio-
economic challenges associated with hosting refugees in 
already-struggling neighbouring countries could spark 
better growth prospects in the regions involved. Conse-
quences may also be felt in Europe, considering the role 
that the refugee issue plays in both the local political 
landscape and EU foreign policy. 
However, the reality on the ground is not particularly 
promising. In Syria, in particular, the return of refugees 
and IDPs is primarily considered to be a security and 
political matter for the regime and its allies, with little 
attention paid to the economic dimension.13  e return 
process is not expected to be massive or immediate, and 
will most likely be selective, by prioritising, for instance, 
women, children and the elderly. It will be carefully man-
aged to ensure regime control continues on the ground.
In Iraq, the post-2014 displacement is only the most 
recent of a series of displacements that stretch back to 
1968 and were accentuated by the 2003 US-led invasion 
and subsequent civil war. Problems for the return of pop-
12. World Bank, Middle East and North Africa region (2017) ‘ e 
Economics of Post-Con ict Reconstruction in MENA’, MENA Eco-
nomic Monitor 
13. Fadi Adleh and Agnès Favier Local reconciliation agreements 
in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, Research Project Report 
2017/01, RSCAS/Middle East Directions, June 2017 
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ulation are likely to persist a er the end of the war against 
IS, given the political and economic role that militias play 
in liberated areas and their control over resources and 
reconstruction projects14. 
In Yemen, where there the number of IDPs and refugees 
is estimated at three million, the economic situation is the 
most pressing underlying issue.  eir return – once the 
hostilities cease and some basic security is restored – will 
largely depend on the availability of economic resources 
to rebuild the country a er three long years of devasta-
tion brought about by the Saudi-led campaign, which in 
turn followed many years of economic decline15. 
In addition to the continual engagement in predatory 
and rent-seeking behaviours, those elites that emerge as 
the ‘winners’ in reconstruction will therefore be driven 
by political concerns and objectives.  is will prevent the 
full potential deriving from the return of refugees and 
IDPs from being achieved, while refugees will continue 
to represent a regional and international issue of conten-
tion, highlighting the various parties’ diverging priorities 
in the stabilisation process.  e EU and neighbouring 
countries, for instance, are likely to push for refugees’ 
return, while the restored regimes will try to use their 
return as a bargaining chip.
 e External Actors
Internal and regional political and political economy 
factors will shape the stabilisation and reconstruction of 
war-torn countries in the MENA region. However, they 
are not the only factors to in uence these processes.  e 
availability of resources for reconstruction and external 
actors’ willingness to get involved in political and diplo-
matic attempts to resolve the con icts will also be impor-
tant.  ey will likely be driven by short-term political, 
tactical and commercial considerations, both at the inter-
national and regional levels. 
 e US administration, for instance, has openly stated 
that its stabilisation objectives in Syria are to ensure an 
enduring defeat of IS and to facilitate the conditions that 
would allow the safe and voluntary return of refugees. 
Addressing “bad governance” as a driver of crises and 
14.  International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups:  e Chal-
lenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State’ 30, July 2018
15. Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies ‘Policy Brief: Corruption in 
Yemen’s War Economy’, 5 November 2018
con ict – which has been very high on the US foreign 
policy agenda for the region in previous administrations 
– seem to have now disappeared from the agenda and 
with it, the will to actively participate in reconstruction 
and paci cation16. 
 e European Union is facing important dilemmas. On 
the one hand, there is no political appetite to support 
reconstruction in countries like Syria, where the regime, 
accused of war crimes, has won militarily and will use 
reconstruction politically.  e EU has repeatedly stated 
that support for reconstruction in Syria and the end of 
sanctions will depend on a credible political process that 
leads to a real political transition. On the other hand, the 
EU political priorities are to contain the jihadist threat 
and to end the refugee crisis. At some point, these might 
induce compromises to accommodate con icting for-
eign policy needs. In addition, di erent member states’ 
o ensive and defensive economic interests tend to push 
policies in diverging directions, as the case in Libya has 
shown.
Reconstruction fatigue is widespread among interna-
tional donors who are facing multiple peacebuilding 
exercises in an environment of prolonged  scal restraint. 
Having to respond to parallel crises and con icts, the 
international community appears less and less capable of 
mobilising adequate  nancial resources. 
On a more systemic level, the Trump administration’s 
transactional approach poses challenges to the peace-
building model which has characterised the interna-
tional community’s action in the post-Cold-War era.  e 
full consequences of the rise of populism, sovereigntism 
and inward-looking approaches in the EU are not yet 
apparent, but they are also likely to feed a lack of will-
ingness to get involved in long-term peace-building and 
reconstruction. Some isolated voices continue to call for a 
new Marshall plan for the MENA region, but the political 
and economic realities in the West make it highly unlikely 
to happen. 
 e private sector is o en perceived as a promising sub-
stitute for the dwindling public funding and limited polit-
ical interest in complicated post-con ict reconstruction. 
Hope is now placed on private investments and lending, 
16. Emily Burch eld, ‘Stabilisation vs Reconstruction: What is the 
Long Term Role of the US in Syria?’, Atlantic Council, 9 February 2018
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as well as public private partnerships.  Local and foreign 
investors and/or  nancial markets have been called on 
to take up the di  cult job. For instance, once the donor 
community realised that there was little hope in mobi-
lising large amounts of public funding in last year’s Iraq 
Reconstruction Conference in Kuwait, it was quickly 
renamed the Iraq Investment Conference, in the hope 
that the private sector could play a major role. 
However, this may be wishful thinking. Private investors 
are driven by pro t opportunities and cost-bene t anal-
ysis, which take into account the potential risks of oper-
ating in certain markets, including reputational and reg-
ulatory risks. Post-con ict countries present numerous 
problems in terms of poor business environment, polit-
ical risk, lack of legal guarantees and corruption – to 
mention but a few – which greatly reduce their attrac-
tiveness.  ey also have no bankable projects to attract 
international lending, no clear reconstruction planning 
and long-term economic vision for the future to provide a 
stable trajectory for their post-con ict development. As a 
result, international investors – with some limited excep-
tions in the oil and gas sector – tend to shy away.
Regional powers see reconstruction as a source of eco-
nomic pro t and an arena for the continuation of their 
rivalry for in uence and hegemony.  e regional secu-
rity situation remains  uid and tensions around Iran are 
building up, a er the US re-imposed sanctions.  ere 
is no sign of de-escalation in the Gulf nor any serious 
attempt to promote a new regional security order or to 
look at, for instance, the economic and political poten-
tials of new models of regional integration, at least not in 
the short term. Regional powers continue to use con icts, 
o en through proxies, to promote geo-political and geo-
economic interests. Because of the regional dynamics at 
play, they are unlikely to change this modus operandi any 
time soon. Nor can it be expected that major reconstruc-
tion funding projects from oil rich Gulf countries take 
place in this context17.
Finally, Russia and China, the new players in the post-
con ict arena, are pursuing new realist and interest-based 
approaches.  ey have already been awarded important 
contracts in reconstruction and are positioning them-
selves to take advantage of upcoming opportunities. In 
17. Michael Young, ‘As Arab States Normalize with Syria, Will this 
Push  em to Finance its Reconstruction?’, Carnegie Middle East, 
Diwan, 24 January 2019
their public discourse, stability is preferable to chaos and 
regime change, even if it comes at the price of restoring 
authoritarian regimes and a corrupt political economy. 
Stabilisation is promoted as the  rst step that in time will 
create the conditions for in-depth change in the region18. 
Power projection, geo-political and geo-economic inter-
ests o en lie behind these statements.  e con icts in the 
MENA region have been the  rst in the post-Cold War 
era where these new international actors have played an 
important role. Inevitably, the post-con ict reality in the 
region will be in uenced by their actions and policies.  
Conclusions
Experience shows that if stabilisation and reconstruc-
tion fail, a relapse of violence is more likely. Some   y 
percent of con icts a er WW2 have re-ignited because 
reconstruction e orts have been mishandled19. It is vital 
that post-con ict countries get this process right and the 
international community should help in this direction. 
While unintended negative consequences of external 
assistance are well known for the MENA region – in 
terms, for instance, of aid dependency or induced distor-
tions – inaction is not an option, particularly for the EU, 
which is likely to pay a high price if instability continues 
across its southern border. 
 e peace-building model adopted in many post-Cold 
War con icts envisaged a protracted e ort to assist 
post-con ict countries in exiting war economies, and to 
ensure the successful reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure, governance institutions and the economy. 
Looking particularly at a strategic approach for post-con-
 ict MENA countries in the economic area – in addition 
to stabilising the macroeconomic framework – economic 
rehabilitation would require increasing sustainable 
growth, creating jobs and  ghting inequality. Long-term 
projects would also be needed, such as the diversi cation 
of the economies away from hydrocarbon dependence, 
and their upgrading in the global value chain. Diversi-
 cation would also be essential to weaken rentier state 
dynamics. 
18. Paul Cochrane, ‘A er the war: Who’s going to pay for Syria’s recon-
struction?’ Middle East Eye, 17 November 2017
19. Barbara F. Walter, ‘Con ict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-
Con ict Peace’, World Bank, September 2010
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In order to do this in an inclusive and participatory way, 
a new social contract would be needed to address some of 
the root causes that are at the origin of the con ict cycle. 
It could replace the old social contract – which is based 
on participation in the sharing of rent through subsidies 
in exchange for limitations in political freedoms and in 
the accountability of regimes – with a new version built 
on consensus around basic economic principles and how 
to divide rents in a way that is bene cial for social devel-
opment and individual growth. A new vision for the state 
and the economy, allowing for inclusive reconstruction, 
the investment of oil rent in addressing people’s basic 
needs together with the needs of future generations, as 
well as the upgrading of human capital. Reconstruction 
would also need to consider issues related to the relation-
ship between the centre and the regions, to avoid that 
development remains focused on major cities, with entire 
regions and communities remaining marginalised. Issues 
of decentralisation and local development would need to 
be seriously tackled. 
As we have seen in this brief, the post-con ict political 
economy of MENA countries is not going to facilitate pro-
cesses of inclusive reconstruction.  e absence of inclu-
sionary political processes might intensify the struggle 
over resources and prolong war economy dynamics long 
a er the end of hostilities. Because of the situation on the 
ground, commitments to complex political processes at 
the national and regional levels are unlikely, as are large-
scale public funding schemes to meaningfully address 
reconstruction needs in the MENA region. Ambitious 
initiatives to support reconciliation, state and institution 
building, and to guide post-con ict countries on the path 
to long-term, sustainable stabilisation and reconstruction 
are also improbable. 
 e persistence of low-intensity con icts along geograph-
ical, ethnic and sectarian lines, and a context in which 
a no-war, no-peace situation prevails across the region 
and rivalries continue is a probable scenario. Against this 
backdrop, there is a need for a realistic approach on the 
part of the international community and particularly the 
EU in addressing the challenges arising from stabilisation 
and reconstruction in the MENA region.  Donors should 
actively use their political in uence and diplomatic o  ces 
as well as leverage their reconstruction assistance to help 
pursue the strategic objectives highlighted.20
20. On an interesting approach to reconstruction in Libya see: 
various authors, ‘Empowered Decentralization: A city Based Strategy 
for Rebuilding Libya’, Brookings, 2019
 e response to the complex challenges probably lies in 
 exible and adaptable strategies. At the micro level, it will 
require adopting a bottom-up approach and looking for 
acceptable partners in the reconstruction process, such as 
local communities, municipalities, small businesses, civil 
society and youth organisations. On a more macro level, 
an integrated holistic approach will need to be backed 
by appropriate and su  cient political and economic lev-
erage. 
Signi cant economic and trade incentives together with 
more ambitious long-term projects for the region, which 
aim for instance to foster trans-Mediterranean and trans-
regional connectivity, as well as the participation of the 
MENA in the EU value chain, would probably go a long 
way. Even in the type of environment that is emerging in 
post-con ict MENA countries.   
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